Smart Contract Security Audit Report
Produced by: BevorAI Agent
š Disclaimer: This report is generated by the BevorAI Agent, an experimental AI-based auditing tool. While every effort is made to ensure accuracy, this report should not replace a professional, human audit.
ā ļø Severity Level Definitions
- Critical: šØ Issues that can lead to contract compromise or significant financial losses.
- High: š“ Severe bugs that may result in major exploits or disruptions.
- Medium: š Moderate risks with potential functional or security impacts.
- Low: š¢ Minor issues with limited risk or impact.
š Audit Summary
- Contract Address: 0xA894D982C61bfe7d424958722860E0DD685196B9
- Audit Date: 2025-03-15
- Auditor: BevorAI Agent
š§ Introduction
The BeeperCoin
contract is an ERC20 token designed to facilitate transactions and manage gas claims for its deployer. It incorporates standard ERC20 functionalities while also allowing the deployer to claim gas fees.
š Audit Scope
The audit focused on identifying vulnerabilities related to access control, control flow, data handling, economic exploits, unsafe logic, and unsafe math within the BeeperCoin
smart contract.
š Findings
šØ Critical
Insufficient Access Control
- Explanation: The
claimGas
function is only restricted by the check against deployer
. After the constructor runs, the ownership is transferred to address(0)
, allowing any address to call claimGas
and withdraw funds from the contract.
- Recommendation: Remove the ownership transfer to
address(0)
in the constructor. Maintain the deployer as the owner or implement a proper ownership transfer mechanism.
- Code Reference: Constructor:
constructor (string memory name_, string memory symbol_) ERC20(name_, symbol_) { _mint(msg.sender, 1000000000000000000000000); deployer = msg.sender; }
š“ High
Reentrancy Vulnerability in claimGas
Function
- Explanation: The
claimGas
function allows the deployer to send Ether to a recipient using the sendValue
function. If the recipient is a contract that calls back into the claimGas
function, it could lead to unexpected behavior or reentrancy attacks.
- Recommendation: Implement a reentrancy guard or follow the checks-effects-interactions pattern by updating the state before making external calls.
- Code Reference:
Address.sendValue(recipient, amount);
in claimGas
function.
DoS with Unexpected Revert in claimGas
Function
- Explanation: If the recipient contract reverts during the Ether transfer, the entire transaction will revert, preventing the deployer from sending gas to legitimate recipients.
- Recommendation: Consider using a pattern that allows the function to handle failures gracefully, such as logging the failure without reverting the entire transaction.
- Code Reference:
Address.sendValue(recipient, amount);
in claimGas
function.
Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- Explanation: The
claimGas
function can be called by anyone if they can impersonate the deployer. A malicious actor could front-run this transaction to manipulate the state or the recipient address.
- Recommendation: Implement checks to ensure that only the deployer can call this function and consider using a nonce or timestamp to prevent replay attacks.
- Code Reference:
claimGas
function.
š Medium
Unchecked Return Value
- Explanation: The
sendValue
function calls recipient.call{value: amount}('')
, which can fail if the recipient does not handle the incoming Ether properly. The calling function does not handle the case where sendValue
might revert due to the recipient's failure to accept the Ether.
- Recommendation: Consider adding a try-catch mechanism or a more informative error message in the
claimGas
function to handle potential failures gracefully.
- Code Reference:
Address.sendValue(recipient, amount);
in claimGas
function.
Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes
- Explanation: The contract relies on
msg.sender
for the claimGas
function, which could be manipulated in a way that exploits the contract's logic if randomness is needed in the future.
- Recommendation: If randomness is needed in the future, consider using a secure source of randomness such as Chainlink VRF.
- Code Reference:
claimGas
function.
Gas Optimization in Allowance Logic
- Explanation: The allowance function includes a gas optimization for specific addresses, returning
type(uint256).max
. This may lead to unexpected behavior if users are not aware that these specific addresses have unlimited allowances.
- Recommendation: Ensure that these addresses are trustworthy and that they do not introduce vulnerabilities through unexpected behavior.
- Code Reference: Allowance function.
š¢ Low
Non-standard Decimal Value
- Explanation: The
decimals
function returns 15
, which is non-standard for ERC-20 tokens (typically 18
). This may lead to confusion or unexpected behavior in applications that assume the standard decimal value.
- Recommendation: Consider using the standard decimal value of
18
for better compatibility with existing ERC-20 token standards.
- Code Reference:
function decimals() public view virtual override returns (uint8) { return 15; }
.
Transfer Ownership to Zero Address
- Explanation: The constructor transfers ownership to the zero address, meaning that the contract will have no owner after deployment. This could be a design choice but also means that no one can manage or upgrade the contract.
- Recommendation: Reassess the decision to transfer ownership to the zero address to ensure it aligns with the intended functionality of the contract.
- Code Reference: Constructor:
_transferOwnership(address(0));
.
ā
Conclusion
The BeeperCoin
contract exhibits several vulnerabilities primarily related to access control, reentrancy, and transaction-ordering dependence. Addressing these issues is crucial to enhance the security of the contract and protect against potential exploits.